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Nietzsche's Laughter; Plato's Beard 
MiChael 1. Monahan 
Purdue UniverS'ity 
Postmodern thought is marked by a 
rejection of tradition; more specifically, 
the tradition of metaphysics. Every 
thinker who is considered to be "post-
modern" has in some way or another 
challenged some aspect (or the entirety) 
of modern metaphysics. Friedrich 
Nietzsche is perhaps one of the first 
philosophers to (arguably) fall under the 
category of postmodernity.' Nietzsche's 
case is unique, however. His modus 
operandi deals not so much with the 
destruction of reconfiguration of meta-
physics, but with laughing at it. For 
Nietzsche, laughter is the natural, and 
perhaps most healthy, reaction to the 
human condition. It allows one to func-
tion in a world that would otherwise be 
so confusing, so overwhelmingly incon-
gruent and frustrating, that despair would 
inevitably claim anyone who took it too 
seriously. 
The root of Nietzsche's thoughts on 
this matter can be found in the tale of 
Silenus, which he relates in The Birth of 
Tragedy.2 Silenus reveals to the wise 
king Midas that all of humanity lives in 
vain; we would be better off not to have 
existed at all. The tale is an ancient one, 
but Nietzsche clearly believes that there 
is truth in it yet. The tale of Silenus 
serves as a backdrop for the entirety of 
Nietzsche's philosophy. Silenus lurks in 
the background of his work, playfully 
taunting human vanity. 
The tale also serves as metaphoric 
narrative. Our search for truth has been 
long and arduous, just as king Midas' 
was, and in the end the only truth to be 
found leads to despair and cynicism. 
Midas serves as man's representative in 
the quest for knowledge. He pursues the 
truth with all of the resources at his dis-
posal, and is ultimately victorious. But 
the victory is bittersweet at best. Silenus, 
who can view mankind from the privi-
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leged position of a demigod, reveals the 
ever so elusive truth to humanity ' s cho-
sen representative. Midas learns that the 
truth which he has sought so fervently 
reveals only the vanity of his own exis-
tence. 
As regards humanity, Nietzsche says, 
"Their senses nowhere lead to truth; on 
the contrary, they are content to receive 
stimuli and, as it were, to engage in a 
groping game on the backs of things."3 
Nietzsche was a firm believer in man's 
inherent ignorance. He believed that 
humanity could never in any way arrive 
at any "truth in and of itself," and that all 
of our so called truths are in fact merely 
figures of speech that have been so 
overused as to seem truthful. Thus, Truth 
is too elusive to be found by mankind, as 
we lack the tools that are necessary in 
order to ever grasp it. 
In this light, Silenus, as the embodi-
ment of Truth takes on a different mean-
ing. In the tale, after his capture by 
Midas, he refuses to speak for some time, 
and when he at long last does speak he 
reveals not the Truth but a warning. A 
warning to those who would seek the 
Truth. Silenus is the Truth Nietzsche 
finds impossible to achieve. Even when 
one thinks he has found it, it serves only 
to reveal how little one actually knows. 
Silenus' warning to Midas in this way is 
not so much an endorsement of extreme 
cynicism, but a simple statement that 
there is no "best and most desirable of all 
things for man," all we have is this pre-
carious life, and that leads only to certain 
death. 
The tale of Silenus is an excellent 
analogy for man's position in relation to 
his surroundings. He seeks the Truth" 
only to have it taunt him and then slip 
from his grasp. He who seeks the Truth 
can find only the despair prescribed by 
Silenus. "The pride connected with 
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knowing and sensing lies like a blinding 
fog over the eyes and senses of men, thus 
deceiving them concerning the value of 
existence,"4 Nietzsche states. This decep-
tion "concerning the value of existence" 
is, of course, that if there were such a 
thing to be sought, it should actually be 
available to us as human beings. To 
engage in such a quest is clearly a futile 
effort, and one would be better off never 
to have begun it. Of course, deception in 
and of itself is not necessarily bad, 
according to Nietzsche. "Only by forget-
ting this primitive world of metaphor can 
one live with any repose, security, and 
consistency ... only by forgetting that he 
himself is an artistically creating subject, 
does man live with any repose, security, 
and consistency,"5 Nietzsche asserts in 
On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense. 
At the end of the same text, he paints a 
positive picture of the stoic as one who 
"executes a masterpiece of deception" 
when in the face of misfortune he wears 
the mask of dignity.6 It would seem then, 
that Nietzsche endorses self deception in 
the face of what appears to be a lack of 
actual Truth. When faced with stark real-
ity (or lack thereof), one should 
"exchange truths for ilIusions."7 
This concept of intentional forgetful-
ness appears throughout Nietzsche's 
work. In the Birth of Tragedy he claims, 
"These Dionysian emotions awake, and 
as they grow in intensity everything sub-
jective vanishes into complete self-for-
getfulness."8 This self-forgetfulness can 
perhaps best be seen as a defense mecha-
nism used as an alternative to the self-
deception of Truth. The difference is 
purely pragmatic. The deception called 
"Truth" leads to the life of futility 
warned against by Silenus, while self-
forgetfulness leads to "repose, security, 
and consistency." The main distinction 
lies in the intention. The seeker of Truth 
actually believes that which his senses 
present to him to be true, while he who 
practices active forgetting realizes that 
Truth is forever beyond his grasp, but 
that self-deception is the only way to 
make sense of the world. Thus, the latter 
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could be seen as a pragmatic response to 
the human condition, while the former is 
a vain struggle against the human condi-
tion, while the former is a vain struggle 
against the human condition. 
The underlying problem with self-for-
getting is that people often tend to take it 
far too seriously. So seriously, in fact, 
that they forget that they are forgetting, 
which leaves them in the same position 
as king Midas and other seekers of Truth. 
It was partially to address this issue that 
Nietzsche wrote The Gay Science. Walter 
Kaufmann said of this text, "What 
Nietzsche himself wanted the title to con-
vey was that serious thinking does not 
have to be stodgy, heavy, dusty, or in one 
word, Teutonic."9 That is to say, 
Nietzsche is attempting to counter those 
who take their intellectual pursuits so 
seriously that they convince themselves 
and others that they have a grasp on the 
Truth. This seriousness is the legacy of 
metaphysics, from Plato to the present, 
and Nietzsche believes that it is to be 
avoided. 
This is where the utility of laughter 
enters the picture. Man has found himself 
trapped between the proverbial rock and 
hard place. On the one hand he can 
deceive himself by believing that he has 
access to what is True, which leads to a 
life spent in vain pursuit of a goal he can 
never achieve. On the other hand, he can 
deceive himself by ignoring (self-forget-
ting) the state of ignorance in which he 
must forever dwell, pretending that what 
he perceives is true, despite his knowl-
edge of the contrary. In either case, one 
is forced into a situation which demands 
self-deception. Nietzsche's solution to 
this problem is far simpler than either of 
these: laugh 
Laughter serves as a panacea for the 
ailments caused by man's limited intel-
lect. Indeed, even in his earliest works 
Nietzsche endorsed jubilance and laugh-
ter: "In song and in dance man expresses 
himself as a member of a higher commu-
nity; he has forgotten how to walk and 
speak and is on the way toward flying 
into the air, dancing. His very gestures 
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express enchantment."10 In the context of 
The Birth of Tragedy "song and dance" 
refer to the Dionysian; that which deals 
with celebration in a sense, self-forget-
ting. Thus, Nietzsche makes it clear that 
he believes that this lighter side, the 
Dionysian, raises man to a higher status, 
above and beyond the realm of mortals; 
he becomes godlike. 
But how does this transformation 
occur? What is it about laughter that 
leads man beyond the limitations of his 
limited intellectual capacity. For 
Nietzsche, laughter is similar to intoxica-
tion, which blurs the "reality" around us 
and elevates us to a dream-like state: "He 
feels himself a god, he himself now 
walks about enchanted, in ecstasy, like 
the gods he saw walking in his dreams. 
He is no longer an artist, he has become a 
work of art: in these paroxysms of intoxi-
cation the artistic power of all nature 
reveals itself to the highest gratification 
of the primordial unity."l l 
This concept of Dionysian laughter is 
the very answer Nietzsche offers us for 
the dilemma outlined above. The rela-
tionship between laughter and intoxica-
tion is further stressed in the text by the 
use of the word "paroxysms" in conjunc-
tion with intoxication; a word which is 
often used in the same manner with 
laughter. l2 Nietzsche stresses again and 
again the "elevated" status brought about 
by laughter. For him laughter transcends 
the mortal realm and leads one beyond 
the confines of human limitations to a 
higher state in which these limitations are 
of no importance. 
Yet it is not at first clear how this 
laughter differs from self-forgetting. 
They both seem to involve a self-inflict-
ed ignorance of man's pitiable state. The 
one by active forgetting, the other by 
laughter. Both in one way or another deal 
with the knowledge that the Truth is 
beyond the grasp of humanity, and both 
offer ways for man to live with "repose, 
security, and consistency." The differ-
ence lies in the fact that the one operates 
through deception, while the other in no 
way attempts to deceive. The self-forget-
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ter (if I may be permitted to coin such a 
phrase) engages in a self-deception every 
time he actively forgets that everything 
he perceives is a lie. While this deception 
is very pragmatic, and allows its practi-
tioner to function in his environment, it is 
nevertheless deception, and even for 
Nietzsche, striving for knowledge is bet-
ter than deceiving oneself. 
Laughter, as opposed to self-forget-
ting, does not involve deceptiqn of any 
sort. On the contrary, the Dionysian has 
come to understand the fictitious nature 
of the Truth, and instead of ignoring it, or 
attempting to forget it, he chooses to 
laugh at it. He faces the vanity of his sit-
uation and the impotence of his intellect 
not with the deceptive "dignified mask" 
of the stoic, or the stodgy seriousness of 
the metaphysician, but with paroxysms 
of Dionysian laughter. He rises above his 
surroundings by mocking them, he finds 
solace in the irony of life that surrounds 
him. 
Thus, laughter in this way is clearly 
not deceptive. It could perhaps best be 
seen as making the best of a bad situa-
tion. The Dionysian, when faced with the 
futility of his struggles does not despair 
or lie to himself, but simply finds humor. 
Humor then takes him beyond the futili-
ty, and he becomes "like a god." 
According to Gilles ~eleuze, "For 
. Nietzsche, laughter always refers to an 
exterior movement of irony and humor, a 
movement of intensities, of intensive 
qualities, as Klossowski and Lyotard 
have pointed OUt."l3 
This "movement of intensities" refers 
to humanity's situation as regards Truth. 
When one is faced with the intensity of 
our surroundings (and their correspond-
ing message from our friend Silenus), the 
best reaction is to laugh. The more 
intense Ouf surroundings, the more 
intense the laughter. The resulting intoxi-
cated state forces us to transcend this 
intensity until it decreases to insignifi-
cance, and we can again go about our 
business. Laughter serves as a filter, with 
which we protect ourselves from the 
intense futility and anguish that Suf-
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rounds us. It is indeed a panacea, curing 
us of the disease of seriousness and futili-
ty, it sends Silenus scurrying back into 
the primeval forest where he belongs, 
and temporarily diverts Midas from his 
misguided quest. 
In this way, laughter is far more prag-
matic than even self-forgetting, because 
the Dionysian never lies to himself. For 
the self-forgetter, the fac;:ade of his decep-
tion can at any time crumble, revealing 
the taunting figure of Silenus, and his all 
too real words of wisdom. The self-for-
getter balances on a precarious ledge 
between blissful self-imposed ignorance, 
and terrifying knowledge of humanity'S 
(not at all intentional) ignorance. 
The Dionysian, however, stands upon 
much more secure ground. Whenever 
Midas' hunt becomes too real, too 
intense, the Dionysian needs merely to 
laugh, to toss back his head in a state of 
beautiful intoxication and "dance with 
the gods." One must not understand this 
laughter as mocking the problem, or 
making light of Silenus' statement. Far 
from it, the laughter mocks man's 
propensity to take the problem too seri-
ously, to hang on Silenus' every word. 
Thus laughter serves not to lessen the 
condition in which humanity is situated, 
but to lessen the degree to which we 
attach importance to the condition in 
which humanity is situated. 
When Nietzsche says that laughter 
makes man "like unto a god," it is not 
meant to refer to the omniscience of the 
traditional Judeo-Christian God, but the 
capacity for action, the capacity for life, 
embodied in the Hellenic gods. The 
laughter transports us not to a realm of 
superior knowledge, but to one of superi-
or propensity for action. Laughter 
enables man to act. Not in the way that 
self-forgetting does; not by carefully con-
cealing the problem behind flimsy walls 
of self-deception. It enables us to act by 
trivializing the problem and provides us 
with a perspective which grants us more 
freedom of movement. 
Not only does laughter allow us to act 
within the confines of our situation, but it 
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allows us to act with originality. In 
laughing at the irony of life and thereby 
entering the realm of the Dionysian'., we 
gain a unique perspective. By throwing 
back our heads and laughing at the futility 
of existence we assert not only our own 
life but our very will. We are in a manner 
of speaking saying, "This situation dis-
gusts me, but my laughter will put it in 
it's proper place so that it cannot bring 
me to despair." Laughter brings revela-
tion, it elevates our existence so that we 
can find new ways to deal with our situa-
tion. Not necessarily to distance ourselves 
from it, nor to deceive ourselves about it, 
but work with it, to find solace in our 
laughter and security in our godliness. 
Thus, if one were to map out a 
"genealogy of laughter," it would have to 
begin with the realization that Truth is 
beyond our grasp. It must be made clear 
that Nietzsche never denies the existence 
of an objective Truth, he merely asserts 
that statements we hold to be "truths" are 
nothing more than "dead metaphors". 
Once Truth is safely placed beyond the 
grasp of human ken, Nietzsche describes 
the dilemma we face. We can choose to 
continue to blindly pursue the Truth, 
despite the futility of this act, or we can 
choose to actively forget this fact, and 
continue to live as if what we perceived 
were in fact True, or we can choose to 
separate ourselves from this problem by 
transcending it through laughter. In the 
end, Nietzsche endorses laughter, 
because it is not only the most effective 
method of dealing with the human condi-
tion, but enables us to move beyond it for 
brief moments, expanding the terrain of 
our thoughts. 
It was Nietzsche's own laughter that 
enabled him to write such original texts. 
Nineteenth century Germany was steeped 
in the tradition of modem metaphysics, 
but nevertheless, Nietzsche was able to 
some extent to move beyond it, to enter 
"the realm of the godlike." This capacity 
stems from his ability to see the irony 
evident all around him, and transcend it 
through laughter. Laughter in fact serves 
as a perfect icon for postmodemity. It 
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acknowledges both the successes and 
failures of metaphysics, while at the 
same time distancing the one who laughs 
from it and enabling him to critique and 
eventually move beyond it. 
This transcending movement, howev-
er, is not such that the object which is 
being laughed at is somehow being made 
smaller. Laughter is in fact incapable of 
affecting the object of its mockery 
(except, of course, when one laughs at 
another person). What laughter is able to 
do is to elevate the position of the one 
who laughs. It does not so much deny the 
importance of what is being mocked, but 
affirm the greater importance of the one 
who laughs. Instead of affecting the 
object negatively, it affects the agent pos-
itively. One who laughs gains power 
from that laughter; the power to 
acknowledge its existence and move 
beyond it, because it does not cause him 
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to despair. 
In order to reject, destroy, or even cri-
tique .such a thoroughly entrenched tradi-
tion as metaphysics, one must be able to 
place it in its proper perspective and 
somehow move beyond it. Laughter 
serves as one of the better (perhaps best) 
means to this end. It elevates the one who 
laughs beyond the tradition and enables 
him to react from this superior vantage 
point. It is laughter alone which grants 
humanity the power to function not only 
in our environment, but beyond it as well. 
For Nietzsche, observation of the world 
and the struggle for knowledge are not 
inherently terrible things to do, as long as 
one doesn't take one's study, or one's 
self, too seriously. When the reality and 
futility of our surroundings grows too 
intense, our only hope is to throw back 
our heads, cast our gaze toward 
Olympus, and laugh at its folly. 
I. Postmodernists would probably object to my use of the word "category,"' but I think for the purpose of expediency I 
shall let it remain. 
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